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Abstract 
We use the length of employment contracts to estimate CEO turnover probability and its 
effects on risk-taking. Protection against dismissal should encourage CEOs to pursue riskier 
projects. Indeed, we show that firms with lower CEO turnover probability exhibit higher 
return volatility, especially idiosyncratic risk. An increase in turnover probability of one 
standard deviation is associated with a volatility decline of 17 basis points. This reduction in 
risk is driven largely by a decrease in investment and is not associated with changes in 
compensation incentives or leverage.  
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Dismissal is a serious threat to executives. It leads to the loss of current employment, to 
reduced future career options (Brickley et al. (1999)) and, sometimes, to loss of unvested 
equity-based compensation (Dahiya and Yermack (2008)). As public demand for increased 
managerial responsibility has grown over the last three decades, the risk of CEO turnover has 
risen substantially: the incidence of CEO turnover increased from 13% during 1992—1997 to 
17% during 1998—2005 (Kaplan and Minton, 2012). It is therefore important to document 
the effects of turnover risk on managerial incentives. Yet theoretical predictions concerning 
this topic are ambiguous, and empirical measurement is complicated by the endogeneity of 
turnover with respect to performance. This paper assesses the direction (and magnitude) of 
the effect of turnover risk on risk-taking. In order to circumvent the endogeneity problem, we 
use the variation in turnover probability that results from ex-ante contract length. 
Human capital risk leads managers to value risky projects differently than do 
shareholders or the board. Low profitability due to the up-front costs of projects with 
uncertain future cash flows can be hard to distinguish from low profitability due to lack of 
effort or ability. As a result, managers for whom job security concerns predominate have an 
incentive to take less risk than is optimal for the firm. This argument, first advanced by 
Holmstrom (1982), has generated a large theoretical literature on complications and potential 
remedies, starting with Holmstrom and Ricart i Costa (1986).  
However, Iossa and Rey (2013) and Bebchuk and Stole (1993) point out that the 
direction of the risk distortion depends on the information structure. Managers with greater 
career concerns (for instance, when renegotiation is imminent) should overinvest if 
investment sends a positive signal—for example, if the costs of that investment are not 
observable before contract expiration or if investment can be interpreted as exerting effort. 
Another motivation for greater risk-taking in the presence of turnover risk is the “gambling 
for resurrection” dynamic described in the mutual fund literature (e.g., Chevalier and Ellison, 
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1997). There it is argued that the reward—reappointment in the case of the manager—is so 
valuable that the manager is willing to pursue negative NPV projects as long as their upside 
offers improved odds of that manager being retained. 
Although a substantial empirical literature explores the relationship between 
executive compensation and risk-taking, there is not much empirical work that links CEO 
career concerns to firm risk. The extant literature exploring firm performance prior to CEO 
turnover is inconclusive: Gibbons and Murphy (1992) document a lower variance of stock 
returns but a higher variance of changes in shareholder wealth during the three years prior to 
turnover. Murphy and Zimmermann (1993) argue that most observed changes in a firm’s pre-
turnover performance are more likely the cause rather the effect of greater turnover risk. It is 
therefore difficult to establish a causal effect of career concerns on risk-taking.  
In this paper, the length of employment contracts delivers ex-ante determined 
variation in turnover probability across time. Many CEOs of US firms operate under fixed-
term employment agreements. Dismissal before the contractual termination date is costly and 
can lead to litigation. More importantly, firms are likely to set contract lengths according to 
their horizons for planning and personnel review. Because the remaining contract length 
decreases with time (and changes upon renewal), we can track the behavior of a given CEO 
under the same contract, as the horizon changes. Based on 3,954 of these contracts, we find 
that contractual protection matter for turnover risk. Using a hazard model, we estimate the 
likelihood of turnover as a function of the CEO’s contract horizon and tenure. Being one year 
closer to the contract’s expiration date translates into a 21% higher probability of termination, 
controlling for tenure.  
One potential concern is that the contract length may be decided upon in conjunction 
with investment plans. Yet, we show empirically that investment cycles neither coincide with 
risk outcomes nor explain the observed relation between risk and turnover probability. To 
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ensure that contract length does not reflect investment plans that are not part of our 
investment cycle measure, we exploit the “sticky” nature of contract cycles (Hall 1999; Shue 
and Townsend, 2013) and use previous contracts to predict the length of the next contract. 
The prediction is thus based only on past information and is not affected by future investment 
plans. Using previous contracts to estimate turnover risk—while controlling for investment 
cycles—match the results using actual contracts. 
A second concern is that the contract length variable delivers exogenously timed but 
imprecise changes in turnover risk. That is, contract length gives us a good estimate of 
turnover risk in the case of a distant expiration date, but becomes less precise as election days 
come closer and performance-related measures become a more important aspect of 
evaluations. Using prior performance to predict turnover risk yields results similar to the 
results using contract length.  
Following the literature (e.g., Guay, 1999; Cohen et al., 2000; Hayes et al., 2012; 
Gormley et al., 2013; Shue and Townsend, 2013), we use realized stock return volatility as 
our primary measure of risk-taking. We find a significant negative relationship between 
turnover probability and risk-taking so defined. A one-standard-deviation increase in the 
likelihood of CEO turnover is associated with a 17-basis-point decrease in volatility. Since 
this relation might not be linear, we split firms into quantiles of high and low turnover risk. 
We discover no evidence of gambling for resurrection in either the high-risk or the medium-
risk quantiles. At the end of the CEO’s contract, speculation about possible re-appointment 
(or successors) may increase return volatility. Such effects may bias our results downwards.  
We proceed to show that the negative relation between turnover likelihood and 
volatility is primarily driven by idiosyncratic rather than systematic risk. An increase in 
turnover probability of 10 percentage points is associated with a decrease in idiosyncratic risk 
of 0.6 percentage points, and there is no significant relation between turnover risk and market 
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beta. We also find that this reduced volatility coincides with decreases in investment but not 
in leverage. Finally, we show that turnover risk has little effect on stock returns or accounting 
performance. These findings, too, are not consistent with gambling for resurrection.  
Throughout the analysis, we control for executive—firm fixed effects. In other words, 
we hold the CEO—firm pair constant and exploit the variation in turnover risk throughout the 
CEO’s tenure. One may be concerned that the remaining time under the contract is correlated 
with the CEO’s tenure at the firm. However, contracts get renewed and their length reset and 
changed during the renewal. Our results hold when we only use the subsample of CEOs 
under renewed contracts. Not all CEOs sign fixed-term employment contracts. We control for 
selection into such contracts using a Heckman (1979) selection model based on variation in 
employment law across states. Our findings are also robust to controlling separately for firm 
fixed and executive fixed effects and hold also when we control explicitly for age or tenure 
groups, as well as time-varying compensation elements. 
Our analysis makes several contributions to the existing literature. First, the paper 
contributes to the literature on CEO turnover. The debate in this area has focused on how 
CEO turnover is related to firm performance and corporate governance.  We introduce a 
predictor of CEO turnover that not only improves the precision the turnover probability 
estimation, but also has distinct advantages. Contractual terms establish a turnover timing 
structure ex-ante, independent of performance. This enables empirical researchers to isolate 
the causal effects of turnover risk.  
Second, our work adds to the literature on risk-taking incentives by establishing an 
empirical link between career concerns and stock volatility. Such a link has been assumed by 
the theoretical literature as far back as Fama (1980) and Holmstrom (1982), but despite the 
theoretical interest, empirical evidence linking career concerns and risk-taking is sparse. A 
notable exception is Gormley and Matsa (2011), which uses risk arising from large, left-tail 
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events as shocks to job security. They find that mangers respond to these risks by acquiring 
unrelated businesses with high cash flows in an attempt to limit their downside. A related 
branch of empirical literature, starting with Chevalier and Ellison (1997 and 1999), 
establishes a link between the career concerns of mutual fund managers and the risks that 
they take. However, incentives of fund managers differ from the ones of CEOs as funds are in 
competition to be ranked as top performers, while firms compete for investors by generating 
higher absolute returns (irrespective of between-firm rankings). 
Third, there are only few empirical studies of CEO employment contracts. Schwab 
and Thomas (2005) describe a sample of 375 contracts from a legal perspective. Gillan et al. 
(2009) report that many CEOs operate without an explicit contract. These authors study, the 
choice between explicit and implicit contracts. We build on their work by describing the 
effect of contract horizon on career outcomes, risk-taking and performance.  
1. DATA 
1.1. Contracts 
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Regulation S-K, Item 402 requires the disclosure of 
terms of employment contracts and agreements between US registrants and named executive 
officers. Following Schwab and Thomas (2005) and Gillan et al. (2009), we collect explicit 
contracts from SEC filing exhibits and, when possible, from The Corporate Library. For all 
S&P 1500 firms that do not file an explicit contract, we read all proxy filings and 10ks to 
obtain summaries of contract terms. Some executives sign at-will employment agreements 
that include compensation and severance clauses, but do not specify any employment period. 
These are not included in the sample. We exclude agreements that have not yet been valid 
(e.g., applicable following a change in control) and offers that have been rejected. We obtain 
separation dates from ExecuComp, Risk Metrics, or BoardEx and exclude contracts for which 
it is unclear whether the CEO is still in office or when he left. For 81 renewals in 1994 and 
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1995 we use the renewal agreement to obtain the characteristics of the original contracts that 
were not filed electronically. 
The procedure yields data for 3,954 employment fixed-term contracts for 2,964 CEOs 
by 2,901 firms entered between 1992 and 2008. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics. 
Accounting data are reported for the year prior to the start of the contract. 
TABLE 1 HERE 
Panel A of Table 1 reports the number of and average length (in years) of contracts per 
start year. The number of contracts ranges from 133 in 1995 to 349 in 2006, increasing over 
time. Contract length decreases steadily over time, from 3.77 in 1995 to 2.78 in 2008. This 
decline has paralleled increasing public pressure to increase accountability and decrease job 
security (and entrenchment) of CEOs. This movement has not been confined to the US. In the 
United Kingdom, CEO contract periods have decreased even more dramatically. While the 
average contract in 1992/93 lasted three years (Conyon, 1994), most UK companies have 
moved to one year contracts by 2011 (BIS, 2011).  
Panel B provides a list of the number of contracts by their length. Most contracts are 
less than six years long, with a mode of three (1,515 contracts), followed by two-year (741) 
and five-year contracts (551). Of the 39 contracts that are longer than ten years, 12 are 
explicitly linked to the executive’s retirement age. In total, 28 contracts in our sample are 
explicitly linked to age. As Jenter and Lewellen (2011) document, this typically happens at 
the age of 65 (23 contracts) or around. Most of the 64 contracts with duration below one year 
are renewals effective until the end of the respective calendar year (38 contracts); the 
remaining 26 contracts are for interim CEOs. Evergreens, contracts that are automatically 
renewed every day or month to retain the same contract length, are not frequent, with a total 
of 73 contracts. We list the percentage of a specific length out of all contracts of the (sub-) 
sample underneath the number. The distributions for first contracts and renewed contracts are 
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quite similar to each other. Upon renewal, CEOs tend to receive more evergreen contracts 
and longer contracts, but also extremely short ones.  
Employment contracts are typically governed by the law of the state where the 
employee works. In the case of the CEO, this is usually the state of the headquarter (and 
casual observation of the contracts confirms this hypothesis). Panel C provides the number of 
contracts by headquarter state for the 15 states with the largest number of contracts in the 
sample, obtained from the filing. Most firms are based in California, followed by New York 
and Texas. This is similar to the overall distribution of firms within the COMPUSTAT 
database.  
1.2. Sample selection issues 
It is important to point out that while most companies disclose the length of their CEO’s 
employment contract, some may omit disclosure even though their CEO is subject to a fixed-
term contract. To put the number of contracts in this sample into perspective: Gillan et al 
(2009) survey all S&P500 firms in 2000 on their CEO employment terms and find that 255, 
or 45%, of the CEOs had employment contracts. Our sample contains 236 contracts that were 
in place in 2000 with S&P 500 firms: 19, or 3.8%, are missing. Because S&P 500 firms are 
larger, they are likely to have better disclosure quality: the number of omitted contracts may 
be bigger for the rest of the sample.   
Panel D of Table 1 reports summary information for the year before the contract start.  
The sample firms have a mean firm size in terms of book assets of $1,756 million. Return on 
assets (ROA) averages 2% for the sample, the market-to-book ratio 2.62. Lang and Lundholm 
(1993) find that larger and better performing firms get better disclosure quality ratings by the 
Association for Investment Management and Research (AIMR). If the sample was biased 
towards firms with better reporting standards, it would contain larger and more profitable 
firms. This is not the case: a comparison with COMPUSTAT firms with no contract reveals 
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that these firms are larger and more profitable, with mean assets of $2,621 million and mean 
ROA of 7.1%. This also suggests that the sample bias within smaller firms may not be more 
accentuated. Industry adjusted (Brown and Hillegeist, 2007) AIMR scores in 1994 and 1995 
(the last rankings before they were discontinued) were higher for firms that did not disclose a 
contract (100% vs. 93% for those that did). The sample firms also have a greater frequency of 
restatements (4.7%, vs. 4.5% for firms with no disclosed contract). Overall, these numbers do 
not suggest that firms outside the sample actually have a contract, but do not disclose it 
because of their lower disclosure standards. We will revisit this question in the next section. 
1.3. Descriptive statistics  
Table 2 reports summary statistics for the firm-years under the fixed-term contracts described 
above. These constitute the sample for our subsequent analysis. The mean firm in our sample 
has assets of $1.8 million, an ROA of 3.8%, annual stock returns of 2.5%, a market-to-book 
ratio of 2.7 and leverage of 21%. We use three measures of risk: volatility, beta, and 
idiosyncratic risk. Volatility is the Standard deviation of daily stock returns. Beta is the 
coefficient on the excess market returns when we regress daily stock returns in excess of the 
risk-free rate, and idiosyncratic risk is the standard deviation of the residuals of that 
regression. We report volatility and idiosyncratic risk in percentage points. The mean 
volatility is 3%, the mean beta 0.95 and the mean idiosyncratic risk 0.11. Our sample firms 
on average spend 7% of their assets value on R&D and 5% on CAPEX, and 20% of the 
sample observations are firms that operate in the banking or insurance industry. 
TABLE 2 HERE 
Finally, we report descriptive statistics of CEO and corporate governance 
characteristics. The mean CEO is 54 years old, and 32% are under renewed contracts. He 
owns 0.76% of his company’s stock, receives compensation of 5.2 million (TDC1, inflation 
adjusted to 2000 value), of which 41% is equity-based. Ninety percent of his option holdings 
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are unrestricted. The average Gompers et al. (2003) index is 9.15, 52% of CEOs also hold the 
Chairman position, and 33% of all board members are insiders.  
2. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
2.1. Contract length and turnover risk  
In a fixed-term employment contract, the firm commits to paying compensation for a certain 
number of years; this remains valid after possible premature termination. As an immediate 
consequence, the cost of termination is increasing in the numbers of years remaining under 
the contract. Upon early termination, the executive is typically entitled to a multiple of the 
base salary and the minimum bonus, but this sum can be augmented contractually. As an 
example, take John Mack’s 2005 five-year contract with Morgan Stanley: 
If, during the Employment Period, the Company shall terminate the Executive's 
employment other than for Cause, death or Disability or the Executive shall terminate 
employment for Good Reason: (i) the Company shall pay to the Executive in a lump-sum cash 
payment as soon as practicable after the Date of Termination the aggregate of the following 
amounts: 
…an amount equal to the product of (1) the Executive's Total Compensation for the 
most recently completed fiscal year and (2) the greater of (x) a fraction, the numerator of 
which is the number of days from the Date of Termination through the fifth anniversary of the 
Effective Date, and the denominator of which is 365 and (y) 1.[…]1 
Hence, in Mr. Mack’s case, the cost of dismissal prior to contract expiration is the 
product of his total compensation and the number of years remaining until the contractual 
termination date. The total compensation of Mr. Mack was $45 million in 2006, the first year 
of his employment contract, and so severance pay for termination in 2006 would have 
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 Morgan Stanley, Form 8K, filed September 22, 2005, Exhibit 10. 
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exceeded $182 million. Assuming that compensation remains at this level, severance pay in 
2009 would have been $45 million, which is $137 million less.2  
Morgan Stanley’s operating income in 2009 was over $1 billion. While $137 million 
is a non-trivial amount, it seems less so compared with the firm value a CEO can destroy. 
Also, fixed-term contracts are renewable, typically with a 30 day notice period before the 
expiration date. If renewal happens always and automatically, contracts should have no 
effect. However, contracts may matter over and above the strictly legal consequences of 
breach on severance pay. Firms may hire a CEO to accomplish a specified task (e.g., turn 
around an unprofitable unit) for a specified time (Anderson et al., 2013). Whether he will be 
needed for another task is to be decided at the end of the first one. The time pattern of 
separations may then reflect how well both parties were able to estimate the time needed. The 
contractual employment horizon can also serve as a signal of commitment: it shows a mutual 
understanding between the CEO and the board on the CEO’s evaluation period. For example, 
some investment projects can be initially unpopular and take time to become profitable. A 
long evaluation period allows the CEO to work without an immediate threat of dismissal. It 
can therefore prolong the CEO’s decision horizon.  
2.3. Estimating turnover risk 
We estimate turnover with proportional hazard models of the general form 
λ(t, ) =λ(t)e
β
	
 
where λ(t) represents the probability that the CEO departs in year t, conditional on having 
remained in office until year t. λ(t) is the baseline hazard, and X is a matrix containing the 
variables that predict CEO turnover. We use two models for the baseline hazard: a Cox 
partial likelihood model (Cox (1972)), which does not specify a functional form for λ(t), 
and a Weibull specification, which defines 
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 For details on severance pay, see Rusticus (2006), Rau and Xu (2009) or Goldman and Huang (2010). 
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λ(t) =λαt
α
 
In our baseline specification, we predict turnover using the number of years remaining 
under the contract. Because contracts are signed prior to observing performance, this estimate 
is unrelated to the actual performance and volatility under the contract. We also include 
industry and year fixed effects to capture fluctuations in the economy, and factors that vary 
across industries, such as the degree of competition, or the supply of CEOs. 
Towards the end of the contract, executives have accumulated performance history 
relevant for the turnover decision. A CEO with a good track record may not face turnover 
risk at the end of the contract, contrary to the predictions of the contract-only specification.  
Therefore, we compare the baseline specification to one that specifically takes endogenous 
performance into account based on Jenter and Lewellen (2010). They estimate CEO turnover 
as a function of B/M, size, profitability, whether the firm pays dividends, and tenure 
performance. Tenure performance is defined as the cumulative stock return over the 
preceding 5 years or since the CEO started her tenure, whichever is more recent.3  Finally, in 
a third model, we use all of the variables to gauge the importance of contracts relative to 
other factors.  
Table 3, Panel A summarizes the results of the estimated hazard models of CEO 
turnover. Column 1 shows a Cox proportional hazard model that predicts CEO turnover using 
calendar year FE and the number of years remaining on the CEO’s contract. CEOs with more 
time remaining under their contract are significantly less likely to leave the firm. Each 
additional year on the CEO’s contract decreases turnover likelihood by 20.5 percentage 
points. Column 2 shows that CEOs of large firms are more likely to be dismissed, whereas 
CEOs with higher past accounting performance and higher past stock returns are less likely to 
be dismissed, holding other factors constant.  
                                                           
3
 Instead of using cumulative industry-adjusted returns, we use cumulative raw returns, and include industry 
fixed effects. Gormley and Matsa (2014) show that fixed effects are the correct method to account for industry 
heterogeneity in this setting. 
  
 
12
Finally, in Column 3 we use both the number of years remaining on the CEO’s 
contract and all the variables from column 2. Importantly, we find that the sign of remaining 
years remains negative, it is highly significant (t=–10.98), and its absolute value increases if 
we control for the variables commonly used in the CEO turnover literature. The coefficient 
estimate of 0.7683 suggests that each additional year on the CEO’s contract renders it 23% 
less likely that she leaves in a given year. The sign, significance, and magnitude of the other 
coefficients is similar to what we estimate in column 2.  We use the estimated hazard rates 
from columns 1-3 in the subsequent analysis shown in Tables 5-8, and call this estimate 
“turnover probability”.  
TABLE 3 HERE 
Columns 3-6 of Panel A report Weibull specifications, which allow for duration 
dependence in CEO turnover. The coefficient estimates are very similar to those obtained in 
the Cox proportional hazard models, and highly statistically significant. In addition to the 
coefficient estimate we report the shape parameter α for the estimated Weibull models. The 
parameter α is significantly different from 1 only in column 6, at the 10% level: we cannot 
reject the null that the distribution exhibits no duration dependence. We conclude that both 
Cox and Weibull hazard model specifications show that the number of years remaining on the 
CEO’s contract predicts CEO turnover.  
The majority of the literature on CEO turnover uses logit (e.g. Denis et al. (1997), 
Mikkelson and Partch (1997), Perry (1999), Huson et al. (2001)) or probit (Jenter and 
Lewellen (2010)) regressions to model CEO turnover. To ensure that our results are not 
driven by our empirical specification, we also estimate logit and probit models on firm-year 
observations, using a dummy equal to one if the CEO leaves in a given firm-year. Panel B of 
Table 2 shows the results of these probit and logit regression models of CEO turnover. The 
results are similar to those of the hazard models. CEOs with a high number of years 
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remaining on their contract are less likely to leave the firm. Overall, we conclude that our 
choice of empirical model does not affect our conclusion that CEO trading predicts turnover. 
The number of years remaining on the CEO’s contract predicts CEO turnover. This effect is 
highly statistically significant in all of our models.  
2.4. Selection into the sample 
To control for the selection bias arising from this non-random exclusion, we follow the 
approach of Heckman (1979) and use the choice regression described below to compute the 
Mills ratio. We use a state law characteristic for the identifying restriction: the at-will 
exception rule of good faith and fair dealing (henceforth “exception rule”). This state-wide 
rule prohibits terminations made in bad faith or motivated by malice.4 This rule protects rank-
and-file employees with shorter contracts or without contracts, which makes such forms of 
employment more attractive. The ensuing popularity of shorter contracts makes it difficult for 
executives to negotiate longer contracts for themselves. The direct judicial consequences of 
the rule to CEOs are likely to be limited, however, since they are protected by individual 
contracts. The listing of these so-called at-will exceptions is reported in appendix A.1 as in 
Walsh and Schwarz (1996) and Muhl (2001). In most states, the rules were adopted between 
1960 and 1980 (before the start of our sample), following debates that were driven by 
political sentiment of that time as well as the particularities of isolated precedent cases. Panel 
D of Table 1 provides a breakdown of the sample by state (for the 15 states with the most 
observations). The sample composition is comparable to the overall COMPUSTAT 
distribution and provides a mixture of states with more and less patents as well as both states 
with and without the exception.  
To identify firms that fail to disclose their CEO contracts, we use determinants of 
disclosure quality: firm size, the number of equity issuances, and the standard deviation of 
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 There are two other exceptions that are less relevant for us. Under the public policy exception, dismissal is not 
allowed if it violates the state’s public policy or a statute. Under the implied contract exception, an employee 
can dispute his/her dismissal if he/she can prove the existence of an implicit (i.e., not written) contract.  
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analyst forecasts. Lang and Lundholm (1993) and Brown and Hillegeist (2007) show that 
these variables affect the disclosure quality as measured by the discontinued AIMR. The listed 
determinants being rather generic firm characteristics, we also include a variable that 
indicates whether the firm has made any restatements in the relevant year, as reported by 
Audit Dynamics. 
We follow Gillan et al. (2009) in their choice of other determinants of long-term 
contracts. They argue that risk should be relevant for the contract length: riskier firms have to 
renegotiate contracts more often. We use their estimates of industry risk: homogeneity of 
stock returns, median sales volatility, and the survival rate per year. Furthermore, CEO and 
board characteristics should affect the negotiation. In particular, there is less uncertainty 
about incumbent CEOs, especially when they have been in their position for a long time. A 
similar argument can be made for older CEOs that have a longer track record in general. We 
control for incumbent CEOs, age, tenure, and use the governance index of Gompers et al 
(2003) to control for the power of the board. To ensure that geographical effects are due to 
the at-will exceptions and not to other legal differences across states, we control for other 
geographical indices such as the anti-takeover index (for the state of incorporation) of 
Bertrand and Mullainathan (1999) and the anti-competition enforceability index of Garmaise 
(2011). All regressions contain industry and year fixed effects to control for exogenous 
shocks to the labor market. 
TABLE 4 HERE 
Table 4 reports the multivariate results. Column 1 shows the results of a probit 
specification that predicts the choice to enter a fixed-term contract with all the above 
mentioned variables. Column 2 uses the variables that are found to be significantly related to 
contract choice in column 1 to predict the choice to enter a fixed contract. This regression is 
used to compute inverse Mills ratios for the regressions reported in the next section.  
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First, states with the exception rule are significantly less likely to issue fixed-term 
contracts, consistent with the findings of Miles (2000). Of the other two geography variables, 
anti-takeover laws are significantly related to fixed-term contracts and the Garmaise index 
only marginally so. CEOs are more likely to enter fixed-term and longer contracts if anti-
takeover laws apply, consistent with a complementary nature of external and internal 
governance (Cremers and Nair, 2005). 
We find little evidence that firms with lower disclosure quality are less likely to 
disclose a contract. To the defence of the disclosure bias hypothesis, firms with a higher 
number of equity issuances are more likely to be in the sample. These firms have more 
disclosure duties. However, smaller firms and firms with more earnings restatements are less 
likely to be in the sample of CEOs with a (disclosed) fixed-term contract. The fact that these 
variables are related to the incidence of a contract as well as the length indicates that they 
measure firm characteristics unrelated to disclosure. The standard deviation of analyst 
forecasts is not significantly related to contract choice, which further suggests that 
information asymmetry is of little relevance to sample selection. 
Industry homogeneity is associated with fewer contracts. In homogenous industries, both 
the CEO and the firm have more outside options, which makes a contract less important. The 
industry risk variables are not significantly related to the contract choice. Incumbent CEOs 
are more likely to receive a fixed-term contract. Older CEOs and CEOs with a longer tenure 
are more likely to have no contract, perhaps because firms are less uncertain about their 
potential. The Gompers et al. (2003) governance index is positively associated with contracts. 
This measure is lower for firms with high shareholder orientation. The positive association 
suggests that boards with less bargaining power are more likely to sign fixed-term contracts. 
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3. RESULTS 
This section documents the relationship between the CEO’s turnover risk and risk-taking. We 
begin with our main analysis on stock return volatility. Subsequently, we analyze different 
forms of volatility, potential sources of risk, and the heterogeneity of the relationship. 
3.1. Stock return volatility 
In this section we explore the effect of an increase in turnover risk on stock return volatility, 
our primary measure of risk-taking. We begin by estimating the turnover risk using contract 
terms. As described in Section 2, the sample is restricted to executives on fixed-term 
contracts. We control for selection into this sample using the inverse Mills ratio from the 
regression described in the previous section. Firms as well as executives differ in their 
capacity and preference for risk. We control for unobserved firm and executive heterogeneity 
using firm-executive fixed effects. Because turnover probability is an estimated regressor 
(Murphy and Topel (1985)), we use bootstrapped standard errors, clustered at the firm level 
in all our regressions (Kayhan and Titman (2007), Petersen (2009)).5  
TABLE 5 HERE 
Column 1 in Panel A of Table 5 shows that the predicted turnover probability is 
strongly correlated with volatility. Lower CEO turnover risk is associated with more 
volatility. The result in column 1 implies that increasing the odds of turnover by one standard 
deviation corresponds to a 17-basis-point decrease in return volatility. The 17 basis points 
correspond to 10% of one standard deviation of return volatility.  
In column 2, we use the predicted turnover probability generated following Jenter and 
Lewellen (2013), taking performance into account. This reduces our sample from 9,030 
observations to 6,709, because of missing data items. Our results are qualitatively unaffected: 
higher CEO turnover risk is associated with significantly lower volatility. The economic 
                                                           
5
 The robustness of these bootstrapped standard errors, used by Kayhan and Titman (2007), is similar, or 
potentially superior to the clustered standard errors (computed without bootstrapping) suggested by Petersen 
(2009). 
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effect is reduced by a factor of one fifth, from a 17-basis-point decrease to a 3.5-basis point 
decrease. We obtain similar estimates in column 3, where we use both contract information 
and the variables suggested by the literature to predict CEO turnover. 
In column 4, we explore the possibility that the relation between turnover risk and 
volatility is nonlinear. In particular, CEOs with very high or low turnover probability may not 
feel compelled to gamble for resurrection, while CEOs with medium-high turnover risk may. 
We regress volatility on dummy variables for CEOs with turnover probability in the lowest 
(low), highest (high) quintile, and in the third and fourth (medium) quintile. That is, our 
baseline comparison group is the second quintile, the group of CEOs that has comparably 
little to fear, but is also not the most protected. We find the same pattern in a variety of other 
classifications: this issue is discussed further in section 3.6. We find no evidence for 
gambling for resurrection. On contrary, CEOs with high turnover probability reduce risk the 
most, with a volatility that is lower by 48 basis points. Low turnover probability is not 
significantly related to volatility. Medium turnover probability related to 10 basis points less 
volatility, a quarter of the coefficient for the high risk category. This confirms our results 
from columns 1 and 2: neither CEOs with medium turnover probability nor those with high 
turnover probability take more risk than those with low turnover probability.  
To further examine whether CEOs gamble for resurrection, in column 5 we regress 
volatility on a dummy for election years. We find that in an election year, the average CEO 
reduces volatility by 8 basis points. Speculation about successions may increase stock 
volatility in the election year. Therefore, the real incentive effect may be even higher.  
Contract horizon is strongly correlated with tenure, and volatility may also be. Pan, 
Wang and Weisbach (2013b) argue that the stock market needs to learn about the match 
between firms and new CEOs, leading to additional volatility in the first years of a CEO on 
the job. Bushman, Dai and Wang (2010) argue that uncertainty about the CEO’s talent leads 
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to higher risk of turnover. To make sure that our results are not driven by tenure and, 
specifically, new CEOs, we repeat the analysis of column 1 with only CEOs under a renewed 
contract. The results in column 6 are weaker than those in column 1, with a coefficient of -
0.58, but still significant at the 1% level. This confirms that the finding of Pan et al. (2013b) 
is relevant in our sample, but also confirms the relation between turnover risk and volatility 
over and above this effect. 
 3.2. Composition of volatility 
In Panel B and C, we decompose volatility to examine whether the effect of turnover risk is 
stronger for idiosyncratic or systematic risk, and repeat the regressions discussed in the 
previous section using these dependent variables. Chevalier and Ellison (1999), in the  
context of mutual funds, argue that young managers with a more recent track record have an 
incentive to herd: if they do not perform well, then at least they do so at a time when other 
candidates for their job are likely to perform equally poorly. Although mutual funds differ 
from other firms along several dimensions, we are interested in whether this basic intuition 
applies equally to CEOs: whether CEOs gamble for their re-election. The CEO can reduce 
systematic risk without taking on or cancelling investment projects, for example by a 
reduction in hedging activities, while idiosyncratic risk requires investment opportunities. 
Therefore, CEOs who try to gamble before elections are more likely to increase systematic 
risk, possibly in contrast to CEOs who take risk because they feel protected from turnover.  
 Panel B shows that the negative relation between volatility and turnover risk is driven 
by idiosyncratic risk. A one-standard-deviation increase in turnover risk corresponds to a 1.3-
basis-point decrease in idiosyncratic risk (10% of one standard deviation of idiosyncratic 
risk). The magnitudes of all other coefficients are also considerably smaller than the 
coefficients for volatility. The only remarkable difference is shown in column 4: CEOs with 
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low turnover risk take significantly more idiosyncratic risk. Panel C shows that an increase in 
turnover risk is associated with no or very minor reductions in systematic risk. 
3.3. Sources of risk 
Managers can increase either operational or financial risk. In this section, we explore two 
possible specific channels that can drive the change in equity volatility: capital investment 
and financial leverage. Operationally risky decisions may take other forms than investment, 
for example via hiring specific managers or shifting resources between business units. 
Empirically, however, such actions are harder to observe. Capital investment, albeit not 
necessarily risky, is not only easier to measure, but also the channel through which theoretical 
papers typically describe risk-taking decisions. Panel A of Table 6 reports that turnover risk 
is negatively associated with capital expenditures (normalized by the value of assets in the 
previous period). Increasing the odds of turnover by one standard deviation corresponds to a 
decrease of 0.8 basis points in capital expenditures, or 5% of one standard deviation. This is 
consistent with the argument that CEOs are more likely to take risky investments if they are 
protected from turnover risk. Similarly to our results on total and idiosyncratic volatility, the 
effect persists if we estimate turnover probability using only the variables suggested by the 
literature, or if we use them in addition to contract terms. 
TABLE 6 HERE 
 Panel B shows that the relation between turnover risk and financial leverage is mixed. 
On the one hand, in columns 1, 4, and 5 we find no significant correlation between turnover 
risk and leverage. On the other hand, in columns 2 and 3 we find that higher turnover risk is 
associated with an increase in leverage. However, the economic significance of this effect is 
rather small: a one-standard-deviation increase in turnover risk corresponds to an increase of 
0.0034 in leverage, which is 0.94% of the standard deviation of leverage. We find similar 
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results using book leverage and the level of debt (in logarithms). Overall, the effect of 
turnover risk on leverage is small and hence unlikely to indicate gambling for resurrection.  
3.4. Performance 
Ex-ante, there is no reason for better performance in pre-defined election years. If executives 
gamble for resurrection, however, we may see evidence of tampering not only in terms of 
risk, but also in terms of performance. After all, boards are likely to base their renewal 
decisions on performance measures. To see whether this is true, we repeat the regressions 
described in the previous section with ROA and stock returns as dependent variables. We 
cannot use turnover risk from the regressions with performance variables (columns 2-3 of 
Table 3, Panel A), because this would induce a circularity in our estimation strategy. The 
results are reported in Table 7. We find no relationship between turnover risk and stock 
returns or return on assets. 
TABLE 7 HERE 
3.4. Heterogeneity 
Thus far, we have reported a negative effect of turnover risk on volatility. In this section, we 
explore whether this effect varies with investment opportunities, governance, or by industry. 
Table 8, Panel A reports the results on turnover probability estimated using with contract 
terms; Panel B reports the results using quintiles of turnover probability. 
Incentives to take more risk should be more valuable for firms that have more growth 
opportunities. In contrast, more mature, stable firms should be more concerned about 
overinvestment (Jensen, 1986). In columns 1 and 2 of Table 8, we divide the sample annually 
in quintiles of the market-to-book ratio and find significant results in the lowest and the 
highest quintile. The effect is significant in both subsamples. As expected, the effect is more 
pronounced – almost twice as large – in the quintile with the highest investment 
opportunities. The t-statistics show that the coefficients are significantly different between 
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firms with high and firms with low growth opportunities only in the highest quintile of 
turnover risk.  
TABLE 8 HERE 
One of the most important determinants of dismissals is corporate governance: the 
decision to renew or dismiss a CEO is made by the board. CEOs with more power should 
have less fear of dismissal and therefore their career concerns should matter less for risk-
taking. In columns 3 and 4 of Table 8, we use a direct measure of CEO power to split the 
sample: whether the CEO also holds the position of Chairman of the Board. The coefficient 
on the continuous measure of turnover risk is significantly more negative for non-Chairman 
CEOs, consistent with the argument that these executives have less power and are therefore 
more sensitive to contractual turnover risk. The effects on the turnover risk quintiles are of 
similar sign and magnitude. Non-Chairman CEOs take more risk when they have a low 
probability of turnover, and take significantly less risk when their turnover probability is low. 
Again, we find no evidence of gambling for resurrection. 
 Edmans (2009) and Aghion et al. (2013) argue that blockholders and more 
specifically, institutional owners monitor CEOs and shield them from career risks if 
necessary. This gives CEOs a greater incentive to innovate, and they show empirically that 
firms with greater institutional ownership produce patents that subsequently have more 
citations. Indeed, firms with different levels of institutional ownership (low quintile in 
column 5 and high quintile in column 6) differ in their risk-taking incentives. The effect of 
the continuous measure of turnover probability is significant for both subsamples, but 
significantly more negative for low institutional ownership. Splitting the sample by quintiles 
of turnover risk, we see that the effect for low-institutional ownership firms is more 
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pronounced as a reduction in medium- and high-risk firms, while the effect for high-
institutional ownership firms is concentrated in the lowest and highest quintiles.  
 Columns 7 and 8 analyze the relation between turnover risk and volatility separately 
for internally appointed and externally hired CEOs. The board has more information on 
internally appointed CEOs than on externally hired ones, rendering it easier to assess the 
performance of internally appointed CEOs. Consistent with this idea, we find that internally 
appointed CEOs respond less to turnover risk than externally hired CEOs, albeit not 
significantly on a conventional statistical level. The sign and the magnitude of the coefficient 
are similar to that of the baseline analysis for both groups. Neither externally nor internally 
appointed CEOs gamble for resurrection. 
In columns 9 and 10, we restrict the sample to firms in financial or the oil and gas 
sector. Executives in the finance industry may have more opportunities to manipulate risk, for 
example with derivatives. Contrary to this argument, the coefficient of the continuous 
measure of turnover risk is not significant for firms in the finance industry. The only 
significant relation between volatility and turnover risk is concentrated in firm-years with 
medium turnover risk, which have with less volatility. In contrast, the coefficient estimated 
for the oil and gas industry is negative significant and of greater magnitude than in the 
baseline sample. For these executives, investment opportunities are arguably less cyclical 
because they can always decide between exploring fields themselves or acquiring explored 
fields (Gilje and Taillard, 2012). However, the results are not significant for the quantiles. 
4. IDENTIFICATION AND ROBUSTNESS 
The identification assumption central to the causal interpretation of our findings is that the 
cyclical variation in contract horizon is uncorrelated with unobservables that affect risk and 
are not captured by the firm-executive fixed effects. This can be true for cyclical variables 
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that determine both contract horizon and risk-taking. This section presents robustness checks 
that address these concerns, as well as those related to other potential omitted variables, 
especially related to executive compensation. 
4.1 Expansion plans  
Firms may hire the CEO for a specific task, such as the investment to a certain plant, 
expansion into a new market, or cost-cutting (Anderson et al., 2013). In such cases, the firm 
may choose a contract length equal to the planned duration of the project.6 If our results were 
driven by such task-specific CEO hires, plans underlying the contract length must involve 
upfront risk-taking and little risk at the end. This is true for most expansive projects.  
Although future plans of the firm are not directly observable, we can use historical 
information to extrapolate expansion cycles of a firm. While every cycle is different ex post, 
firms rely on detailed information and experience from past cycles in their strategic planning. 
If expansion cycles are the only consideration that determines the contract horizon, forecasted 
cycles should be equal to the contract horizon. Furthermore, expansion cycles should also 
lead to a risk-taking pattern similar to what we document, even in the absence of contracts.  
We construct expansion cycles as the time elapsed between peaks in investment 
spending growth. We define peaks as years in which capital expenditures grow more than 
25% compared to the previous year. Our results are similar when we use R&D expenses to 
define peaks. Table 9, Panel A shows descriptive statistics of our measures of investment 
cycles. The average CAPEX and R&D cycles are longer than the average CEO contract, at 
3.89 and 4.18 years. The length of an investment cycle is persistent within firms: the standard 
deviation of cycle length within firms is 0.35 for CAPEX and 0.26 for R&D cycles. For each 
                                                           
6
 Anecdotal evidence shows that not all contract durations are matched to existing projects. Specifically, we 
identify five CEO turnover events due to sudden deaths in our fixed-term contracts sample. In all of these cases 
the successor received a contract with a length different from the remaining contract horizon of the deceased, 
and only one received a contract with the same initial contract length. 
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firm-year, we compute the number of years left until the end of the cycle. The average 
difference between this variable and the number of remaining years on the contract is 0.92 
(0.98 using the most recent cycle and 0.97 using R&D to compute the cycle). 
TABLE 9 HERE 
In Panel B of Table 9, we repeat our baseline regressions using the expansion cycle 
together with the turnover risk measure computed using the actual contract horizon. Columns 
1-3 of Panel B show that after controlling for investment cycles our measure of career 
concerns remains negative and highly significant. In contrast, the timing of investment cycles 
is not significantly correlated with volatility in any of the specifications. If expansion cycles 
were driving our results, they should explain risk, and the career concerns measure should 
not: this alternative interpretation is not supported by the data. The results in Table 9 suggest 
that ex-ante expansion plans cannot explain the effect of contract horizon on risk-taking.  
Because our expansion cycle predictions are based on historical, and industry-wide 
data, they may still not capture novel, firm-specific expansion plans that are reflected in the 
actual contract horizon. To address this concern, we predict contract length using the length 
of previous contracts, an approach that has been used in the compensation literature to predict 
option grant cycles (Shue and Townsend, 2013). There are several reasons past contract 
length can predict future contract length: firms may re-use past contracts, repeat evaluation 
cycles, or attract CEOs with similar preferences. Anecdotal evidence by Chief HR officers 
suggests that contract negotiations often use the previous contract as reference point. To 
isolate such information, we replace contract length with the length of previous contracts by 
the same firm. 
We compute historical contract length in three ways: using the most recent, the two 
most recent, and the three most recent fixed-term contracts prior to the current contract. We 
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then replace the actual contract length with this historical contract length for all firms for 
which we observe at least one previous contract, in the year after the previous contract ends. 
We apply this procedure to all firms, regardless of the actual contract length and regardless of 
whether the new contract actually has a fixed term. The resulting contract length is 
comparable to the baseline sample, with a mean of three years. It is sticky within firms, with 
a standard deviation of 0.23 (0.13 and 0.09, respectively, for the two- and three-year 
averages). We then use this predicted contract length to compute the number of years until 
expiration. The average difference between this measure and the actual contract horizon is 
0.61 years. 
Thereafter, instead of using the number of years remaining on the CEO’s actual 
contract we use the number of years that would remain on the contract if the contract length 
were equal to the historic value. First, we repeat the first stage of our analysis: we use this 
modified measure of remaining years to predict CEO turnover. Panel C of Table 9 shows the 
estimates from a Cox hazard model estimated analogously to the model in Column 1 of Table 
3. Our results indicate that one additional year remaining on the CEO’s contract is associated 
with a 4% decrease in the probability of dismissal. Although this is considerably smaller than 
the estimates in Table 3, it is significant at the 10% level in the first specification and is 
economically meaningful, as the unconditional turnover probability in this sample of historic 
contract length is 15.75%. The coefficients of contract length using the previous two or three 
contracts are not significant.7 
In Panel C, we regress volatility on turnover risk (estimated using the historical 
contract length) as well as the expansion cycle. In this regression, the estimation of turnover 
                                                           
7
 There are several reasons that the estimate could be less precise. First, the size of our historic sample is smaller 
than the baseline sample. Second, while replacing our measure of years remaining on the actual contract with 
one based on past contracts eliminates any information that is forward-looking, such as future expansion plans, 
it also eliminates all other information arriving during the historic contract. For instance, if a firm replaced their 
head of HR because of the death of retirement of the incumbent, we would predict that the new head of HR 
would also offer a contract of the same length, which inherently adds noise to our estimates. 
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risk using previous contracts eliminates any forward-looking information from the turnover 
risk measure. The historical contract length may well be driven by information about the 
investment cycle relevant for the historical contract horizon. We add the expansion cycle 
measure to control for this. Despite the small sample size, we find a negative and consistently 
significant coefficient estimate for the turnover risk estimated based the previous contracts, 
even after controlling for the investment cycles. This shows that our results are not likely to 
be driven by firm-specific expansion plans that affect both contract terms and return 
volatility. 
4.2 Business cycles 
Another reason for risk-related cyclicality can be business cycles or product cycles. However, 
when adapting to the business cycle, firms are likely to set contract length in a way that 
would produce the opposite of our results: contracts should end when industry risk is high 
and not when it is low. Moreover, industry cycles are difficult to predict accurately and 
therefore unlikely to cause the precise pattern that we document.  
We nevertheless test this explanation in using the industry-wide contract horizon as a 
forward-looking measure for the industry cycle. We compute three variants of this measure: 
the average length of all contracts that are valid in a given year and industry; the average 
number of years remaining under all such contracts; and the average length of all new 
contracts closed in a given year and industry. The latter measure captures new information 
about the business cycles that were not available to firms at the time when the older contracts 
were signed. It results in an average contract length of 3.1 years, comparable to the baseline 
sample. Using all contracts including old ones results in an average industry “horizon” of 4.1 
years. The variation of these measures is with 0.96 (all) and 0.81 (new contracts) much larger 
than the previously described measures of investment cycles and previous contracts. The 
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average difference between industry horizon and actual contract horizon is 1.25 years.The 
difference is smaller when we use only new contracts (0.60) and close to zero when we use 
the number of years remaining. 
We then estimate volatility with this industry cycle measure, together with our 
baseline measure of turnover risk (Panel B) or the turnover risk estimated with historical 
contracts (Panel C). Industry cycles do not change our main results: the coefficient of 
turnover risk remains negative and highly significant.  
4.3 Controlling for other firm and CEO characteristics 
In this section, we control directly for firm and CEO characteristics that are observable and 
have been shown to affect both contract horizon and risk-taking.  
Compensation. Starting with Holmstrom (1982), the literature has argued that firms need to 
provide compensation packages that incentivize risk taking to offset the effect of turnover 
risk. Several papers provide evidence that compensation such as options is indeed able to 
induce risk-taking (e.g., Agrawal and Mandelker, 1987; DeFusco et al., 1990; Guay, 1999; 
Cohen et al., 2000; Coles et al., 2006; Shue and Townsend, 2013; Chava and Purnandam, 
2010; Gormley et al., 2013). It is therefore possible that our results are driven not by turnover 
risk, but instead by compensation packages that vary across time.   
To disentangle effects of career concerns and compensation, we add three control 
variables capturing the amount and nature of equity-based compensation to our main 
regression: the level of compensation (log of TDC1, the sum of cash compensation and 
equity compensation granted in that year); and the stock price sensitivity of the CEO’s 
unvested and vested portfolio of stock and options, computed using the Core and Guay 
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(2002) methodology. We obtain these variables from ExecuComp, which only provides data 
for a fraction of our sample (4,730 observations).  
TABLE 10 HERE 
The results are documented in column 1 of Table 10. Controlling for compensation 
reduces the magnitude of the coefficient on turnover probability from -0.74 to -0.59, but not 
the statistical significance. The reduction in magnitude is partly due to the restricted 
availability of ExecuComp data: when we repeat our baseline regression on the ExecuComp 
sample, the coefficient is reduced to -0.60 (column 2). Out of the compensation variables, 
only the stock price sensitivity of unvested equity grants is significantly related to volatility, 
albeit the coefficient is quite small, and it is significant only at the 10% level. Overall, we 
find that compensation cannot explain our baseline results; in fact, it has little to no 
correlation with risk once we control for career concerns. 
Tenure and age. Intuitively, it seems unlikely that the CEO adapts the length of her contract 
to a personal risk-taking cycle rather than adapting personal decisions to his career concerns. 
Even if we did have personal data on the CEO’s family, it is impossible for an outsider to 
reconstruct her private plans. However, the CEO’s age and tenure can give us a rough 
indication of her place in the life cycle and career, and they may affect risk-taking in their 
own right. For example, Yim (2013) shows that young CEOs make more acquisitions, and 
Pan et al. (2013a) document a tenure-based investment cycles in which CEOs increase 
investment as they spend more time at the firm. Because age and tenure are collinear with 
contract horizon for a given CEO-firm-contract, we use dummy variables for age and tenure 
groups. CEOs of ages below 55, 55-59, 60-64, and equal or above 65 are grouped together, as 
are CEOs with tenure below 3, 3-5, 6-8 and equal or above 9, following the tenure groups of 
Pan et al., 2013a.  
  
 
29
The results are reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table 10. Controlling for age and 
tenure does not explain our results. The coefficients on turnover risk are significantly 
negative even after controlling for these variables. The coefficients on the age and tenure 
groups are consistent with the literature. Younger CEOs take more risk, similar to the more 
acquisitive young CEOs that Yim (2013) documents; newer CEOs are associated with greater 
volatility, consistent with learning about new CEOs that Pan et al. (2013b) document.  
Firm age. The firm’s history and position in its life cycle may also exhibit a predictable time 
trend. Firms may become less risky as they accumulate assets, equity, and expertise over 
time. We measure firm experience as the age of the firm measured as the log of the number 
of years from its date of incorporation. We obtain this number from Capital IQ. Where this 
number is missing, we use the number of years since the first appearance in COMPUSTAT. 
We report the results in column 5 of Table 10. Controlling for firm age does not explain our 
baseline results: the coefficient on turnover risk is still negative and significant. The 
coefficient on firm age is also significantly negative: stock returns of older firms are less 
volatile. 
Firm or executive fixed effects. Finally, we replace the firm-executive fixed effects in our 
baseline regression with firm or executive fixed effects. This helps control for the effect of 
any unobservable and time-invariant firm or CEO characteristics. Column 6 in Table 10 
reports results for the baseline regression, using firm instead of firm-executive fixed effects. 
Column 7 repeats the exercise using executive fixed effects. All results are qualitatively 
similar and of similar magnitude.  
In summary, results in Table 10 suggest that controlling for compensation, CEO 
characteristics, firm experience, and time-invariant firm and CEO characteristics cannot 
explain away the effect of career concerns on risk documented in our baseline regressions. 
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4.5 Other robustness checks 
Actual turnover. We verify in Table 11 that our results hold when we use the actual, 
observed career horizon of CEOs. To this end, we calculate the number of years until actual 
turnover (column 1) and a dummy for the last two years before turnover (column 2). Both 
measures are significantly correlated with risk in the same way as the anticipated turnover 
risk: for each additional year before turnover, volatility increases by 8 basis points. In the last 
two years, volatility is 34 basis points lower.  
TABLE 11 HERE 
First year. There are two reasons that including each CEO’s first year in the sample could be 
problematic. First, the start date of CEOs rarely coincides with the fiscal year end. Therefore, 
the first fiscal year in which a CEO is present is likely to contain days under the former CEO. 
These data are likely to introduce noise into our estimation. Second, so far, we have 
considered all CEO transactions as voluntary, undertaken either because the CEO had private 
information, or because of their diversification or liquidity needs. However, firms impose a 
minimum level of stock ownership on CEOs (Core and Larcker (2002)). Especially if the 
CEO was hired from outside the firm, fulfilling these mandatory ownership requirements 
may lead to mechanical CEO purchases in the first year of their tenure.  
In another robustness check, we discard all firm-years in which the CEO is in their first year 
(tenure equals 0). Doing so reduces our sample by 1,259 observations (22%).  We then 
estimate the turnover probability excluding the respective first years of each CEO. The results 
are reported in column 5 of Table 10, and are stronger than the baseline regression.  
Deciles. Throughout the analysis, we have used quintiles to classify turnover risk. Our results 
do not change for various quantile classifications (and also not if we assign only the fourth 
quintile as medium etc.). In column 8 of Table 10, we report the results using deciles of 
turnover risk. We classify the tenth decile as high, the first as low, and decile eight and nine 
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as medium. The results are similar to the baseline regression: CEOs with low turnover 
probability have a barely significant coefficient of -0.09, the ones with medium turnover 
probability a significant coefficient of -0.39, and the ones with high turnover probability the 
most negative and significant coefficient of -0.56. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
We estimate the risk of dismissal for CEOs using data on contract terms. Longer contracts 
protect CEOs from turnover: the contractual horizon predicts the likelihood that an executive 
actually leaves office. CEOs with longer remaining contracts have a lower probability of 
termination. While contract terms provide an ex-ante predictor of turnover risk that is 
unlikely to be correlated to contemporaneous performance, insider trades help us form a more 
precise measure that takes all available information into account. Because executives have 
little incentive to invest into the company when their human capital risk is high, insider 
purchases and sales give us the executive’s own assessment of her turnover probability. 
The likelihood of CEO turnover affects risk-taking. Consistent with the predictions of 
career risk models, a higher probability of CEO turnover is associated with lower stock return 
volatility, particularly idiosyncratic volatility. We document a similar effect for capital 
expenditures, which suggests that much of the risk-taking is done via investment. In contrast, 
we do not find similar effects for financial leverage.  
Chief executives are supervised by boards which are responsible for dismissal decisions 
and are likely to participate in greater investment or strategic decisions. Unless the board is 
uninformed or biased towards the CEO, it is likely to prevent apparently unproductive 
gambling for resurrection. Consistent with this argument, we find no evidence for increased 
risk-taking when turnover probability is high. Moreover, our results are more pronounced 
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when boards are dominated by outsiders, suggesting that informed boards actively discourage 
career-related risk-taking. 
This paper is a first effort to document the effects of contract horizon. We hope that these 
preliminary results give some practical orientation to both the governance literature and the 
contract design praxis. Given the availability of new data, we are confident that future 
research will illuminate various other effects, interactions, and remedies for the phenomena 
described in the current paper. In particular, we hope that theorists are inspired to further 
explore the interactions between capital structure policies and career concerns.  
Understanding the interaction between compensation and horizon is crucial for contract 
design. The analysis of this paper shows that contractual horizon is not a substitute for long-
term compensation: in addition of setting a long-term horizon, it also provides the threat of 
abandoning all compensation. Whether and how long-term compensation and severance pay 
can dampen or accentuate some of the effects are promising questions for future research. 
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Table 1 
Summary statistics (start of the contract) 
 
 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics. Accounting numbers are measured at the fiscal year that ends before the contract start date. 
Variables are defined in appendix A.2. 
  
Year Before 1995 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total
Number of contracts 126 133 184 313 262 262 259 278 282 275 344 330 349 325 232 3954
Average contract length 4.23           3.77 3.72   3.47 3.21 3.44 3.45 3.30 3.24 3.15 3.30 3.13 3.06 2.93 2.78 3.28
 Length (years) <1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 >10 Evergreens
All fixed-term 64 416 741 1515 410 551 92 55 22 25 23 39 73
2% 11% 19% 38% 10% 14% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2%
First contract 26 282 506 1132 266 394 55 32 7 10 14 11 19
1% 10% 19% 41% 10% 14% 2% 1% 0% 0% 1% 0% 1%
Renewals 38 134 235 383 144 157 37 23 15 15 9 28 54
3% 11% 19% 31% 12% 13% 3% 2% 1% 1% 1% 2% 4%
State CA NY TX FL NJ PA IL MA OH VA GA MN CT CO MD
Number of contracts 528 440 331 213 213 214 163 157 161 119 110 95 112 85 93
Average contract length 3.33           3.40 3.15   3.60 3.28 3.15 3.14 3.17 3.33 3.28 3.34 2.86 3.35 3.37 3.50 
Sample distribution 13% 11% 8% 5% 5% 5% 4% 4% 4% 3% 3% 2% 3% 2% 2%
 COMPUSTAT distribution 14% 10% 7% 5% 4% 3% 5% 4% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 3% 2%
W/O Fixed-term
Contract Contract 1 year 2 year 3 year 4 year 5 year
Firm Assets ($ millions) 2,621 1,756 2,082 1,757 2,046 1,811 2,361
ROA 7.1% 1.6% -1.7% -0.3% 0.8% 2.4% 2.8%
Market-to-book 2.71   2.62 2.58 2.59 2.45 2.81 2.58 
Disclosure AIMR 100% 93% 74% 90% 86% 97% 95%
quality Restatement 4.5% 4.7% 7.0% 4.1% 5.2% 3.8% 3.9%
Industry Industry survival rate 96% 99% 97% 98% 98% 99% 100%
Industry sales volatility 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8%
Industry homogeneity 41% 32% 32% 31% 29% 31% 37%
Panel A: Number and length of contracts per year
Panel B: Contract length 
Panel C: Number of contracts by state (15 states with the largest number of contracts)
Panel D: Average firm and industry characteristics by contract
Fixed-term
  
 
38
Table 2 
Summary statistics (years under contract)  
 
  
 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics. A CEO is a net buyer in a calendar year if she buys more stock than she sells, and a net seller if she 
sells more stock than she buys. 
 
  
N Mean Median
Standard 
deviation Min Max
Firm Assets ($ millions) 13184 1,762.19 539.88    2,616.94   1.98       8,548.90     
ROA 12893 3.8% 6.5% 18.8% -120.3% 34.8%
Annual stock returns 10508 2.5% 1.5% 12.3% -28.9% 45.0%
Market-to-book 12587 2.70       2.09       2.01         0.36       8.29           
Leverage 13181 20.5% 23.3% 35.6% -78.1% 134.3%
Volatility 11918 3.10       2.63       1.74         0.95       9.69           
Beta 11887 0.95       0.95       0.59         -0.59 2.65           
Idiosyncratic risk 11885 0.11       0.06       0.14         0.01       0.86           
R&D/assets 11992 6.7% 4.0% 9.6% 0.0% 60.1%
CAPEX/assets 13618 4.9% 0.0% 14.5% 0.0% 127.3%
Finance industry 13618 19.8% 0.0% 39.8% 0.0% 100.0%
CEO/ Age 13596 53.99     54.00     8.48         25.00     99.00         
Governance Renewal 13618 31.5% 0.0% 46.5% 0.0% 100.0%
Percent CEO ownership 13618 0.76       -         3.19         -        51.64         
Percent CEO voting power 13618 0.91       -         5.05         -        100.00       
Total compensation (2000 $, tds) 6403 5,239.08 2,510.95 10,459.99 -        245,016.90 
Incentive to total compensation 13618 0.41       0.43       0.36         10.07-     1.00           
Percent unexercisable 13618 0.10       -         0.22         -        2.12           
Governance index 5334 9.15       9.00       2.66         1.00       18.00         
Chairman and CEO 13618 52% 100% 50% 0% 100%
Exception rule 11817 25% 0% 43% 0% 100%
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Table 3 
Turnover risk 
  Panel A: Hazard models of CEO turnover 
  Cox Cox Cox Weibull Weibull Weibull 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Remaining years 0.7946***   0.7683*** 0.7960***   0.7698*** 
  (0.022)   (0.025) (0.022)   (0.025) 
Dividend   0.9044 0.9084   0.8958 0.8974 
    (0.102) (0.103)   (0.102) (0.102) 
B/M   1.0561 1.0381   1.0518 1.0331 
    (0.068) (0.071)   (0.069) (0.073) 
Ln(assets)   1.0840** 1.0965***   1.0967*** 1.1102*** 
    (0.037) (0.037)   (0.038) (0.038) 
ROA   0.4000*** 0.4292***   0.3629*** 0.3954*** 
    (0.109) (0.118)   (0.099) (0.108) 
Tenure performance   0.7869*** 0.7927***   0.7733*** 0.7793*** 
    (0.061) (0.061)   (0.062) (0.062) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
α       1.042 1.0541 1.0603* 
N 9,030 6,709 6,709 9,030 6,709 6,709 
            
  Panel B: Dichotomous regressions of CEO turnover 
  Logit Logit Logit Probit Probit Probit 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Remaining years -0.2659***   -0.3091*** -0.1242***   -0.1463*** 
  (0.031)   (0.036) (0.014)   (0.017) 
Dividend   -0.1283 -0.0982   -0.0608 -0.0517 
    (0.116) (0.118)   (0.058) (0.059) 
B/M   0.0906 0.0861   0.0466 0.0433 
    (0.065) (0.065)   (0.036) (0.036) 
Ln(assets)   0.0402 0.0430   0.0222 0.0244 
    (0.035) (0.036)   (0.018) (0.018) 
ROA   -0.4252 -0.3993   -0.2320 -0.2320 
    (0.301) (0.304)   (0.155) (0.156) 
Tenure performance   -0.1502** -0.1437**   -0.0649** -0.0614** 
    (0.069) (0.069)   (0.031) (0.031) 
Tenure -0.0188** -0.0236*** -0.0264*** -0.0091** -0.0111*** -0.0118*** 
  (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 9,030 6,709 6,709 9,030 6,709 6,709 
 
 
This table presents presents the results of hazard model estimations, reporting hazard ratios for CEO turnover and standard errors 
underneath. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Asterisks indicate that the estimates are significantly different from zero at the 
*** 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level. 
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Table 4 
Choice of contract type  
 
 
 
This table presents marginal effects from Probit regressions and standard errors (in parentheses) that are heteroskedasticity robust and 
clustered by year. All variables are measured in the last fiscal year ending before the start date of the contract. Asterisks indicate that the 
estimates are significantly different from zero at the *** 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level. 
 
 
 
(1) (2)
Geography Exception rule -0.248*** -0.240***
                                   (0.01) (0.01)
Anti-takeover 0.108*** 0.102***
(0.01) (0.01)
Garmaise -0.004*
(0.003)
Disclosure Assets -0.275*** -0.275***
quality (0.02) (0.02)
Restatement 0.175*** 0.176***
(0.05) (0.05)
Log number of SEOs 0.581*** 0.574***
(0.01) (0.01)
Analyst forecast STD -0.001
(0.0005)
Risk Industry homogeneity 0.788** -1.353***
                                   (0.34) (0.23)
Industry sales volatility 0.041
                                   (0.14)
Industry survival rate 0.191
(0.34)
Governance Former CEO 0.317*** 0.317***
(0.09) (0.09)
Age -0.006*** -0.006***
                                   (0.002) (0.002)
Tenure -0.040*** -0.040***
(0.003) (0.003)
Governance index 0.110*** 0.110***
(0.007) (0.007)
Fixed effects Industry Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes
Constant                           -3.157*** -2.937***
                                   (0.36) (0.18)
N                                  32,268        32,268        
Dependent variable: Fixed-term contract
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Table 5 
Risk  
 
  
Sample All All All All All Renewed
Turnover estimation Cox Cox Cox Cox None Cox
Predictor Contract Performance Contract and 
performance
Contract Contract
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Turnover probability -0.741*** -0.152*** -0.131*** -0.576***
(0.097) (0.028) (0.023) (0.125)
Low turnover probability 0.064
(0.054)
Medium turnover probability -0.106**
(0.043)
High turnover probability -0.479***
(0.056)
Election year -0.083**
(0.034)
Mills 6.664*** 5.525*** 5.468*** 6.665*** 6.645***
(1.28) (0.014) (0.024) (1.16) (1.111)
Constant 1.220*** 1.595*** 1.495*** 1.060*** 0.918** 2.939***
(0.415) (0.058) (0.049) (0.379) (0.36) (0.062)
Firm-executive F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 66% 64% 66% 65% 66% 64%
N 8,901 6,709 6,709 8,901 8,901 4,045
Turnover probability -0.057*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.033***
(0.008) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008)
Low turnover probability 0.008*
(0.005)
Medium turnover probability -0.008*
(0.004)
High turnover probability -0.031***
(0.005)
Election year -0.008**
(0.003)
Mills 0.327*** 0.236*** 0.233*** 0.331*** 0.331***
(0.105) (0.001) (0.002) (0.093) (0.095)
Constant 0.025 0.046*** 0.041*** 0.011 0.001 0.088***
(0.034) (0.034) (0.005) (0.03) (0.031) (0.004)
Firm-executive F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 61% 61% 58% 58% 60% 58%
N 8,901 6,709 6,709 8,901 8,901 4,045
Panel A: Volatility
Panel B: Idiosyncratic risk
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This table present the results of OLS regressions, reporting coefficients and standard errors underneath that are bootstrapped using 1999 
replications. The dependent variables are as reported in the Panel title. Asterisks indicate that the estimates are significantly different from 
zero at the *** 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level. 
   
  
Sample All All All All All Renewed
Turnover estimation Cox Cox Cox Cox None Cox
Predictor Contract Performance Contract and 
performance
Contract Contract
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Turnover probability 0.000 -0.000** -0.000* 0
(0.0004) (0.0001) (0.00009) (0.001)
Low turnover probability 0.00000
(0.00023)
Medium turnover probability 0.00000
(0.00018)
High turnover probability 0.0000
(0.00024)
Election year 0.00000
(0.00017)
Mills 0.027 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.027 0.027
(0.031) (0.00005) (0.00009) (0.029) (0.03)
Constant 0 -0.007*** -0.007*** 0.001 0.001 0.011***
(0.01) (0.00021) (0.00018) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00025)
Firm-executive F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 37% 38% 39% 36% 37% 32%
N 9,030 6,709 6,709 9,030 9,030 4,030
Panel C: Beta
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Table 6 
Other outcomes 
This table present the results of OLS regressions, reporting coefficients and standard errors underneath that are bootstrapped using 1999 
replications. The dependent variables are as reported in the Panel title. Asterisks indicate that the estimates are significantly different from 
zero at the *** 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level. 
Sample All All All All All
Turnover estimation Cox Cox Cox Cox None
Predictor Contract Performance Contract and 
performance Contract
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Turnover probability -0.033*** -0.008*** -0.007***
(0.006) (0.001) (0.001)
Low turnover probability 0.007**
(0.003)
Medium turnover probability -0.008***
(0.003)
High turnover probability -0.013***
(0.004)
Election year -0.005**
(0.002)
Mills 0.021 -0.010*** -0.013*** 0.033 0.028
(0.223) (0.001) (0.001) (0.221) (0.227)
Constant 0.076 0.081*** 0.061 0.059
(0.073) (0.003) (0.072) (0.074)
Firm-executive F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 53% 60% 62% 51% 53%
N 9,304 8,790 7,792 10,469 9,304
Turnover probability 0.02 0.015*** 0.010***
(0.012) (0.004) (0.003)
Low turnover probability -0.011
(0.007)
Medium turnover probability -0.003
(0.005)
High turnover probability 0.002
(0.007)
Election year 0.003
(0.004)
Mills 0.331** 0.580*** 0.331** 0.332** 0.329**
(0.145) (0.002) (0.145) (0.133) (0.144)
Constant 0.047 -0.055*** 0.047 0.056 0.142***
(0.048) (0.009) (0.048) (0.047) (0.007)
Firm-executive F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 75% 76% 75% 74% 75%
N 9,030 6,709 6,709 11,032 9,846
Panel A: Investment
Panel B: Leverage
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Table 7 
Performance 
 
 
This table present the results of OLS regressions, reporting coefficients and standard errors underneath that are bootstrapped using 1999 
replications. The dependent variables are as reported in the Panel title. Asterisks indicate that the estimates are significantly different from 
zero at the *** 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level. 
Sample All All All
Turnover estimation Cox Cox None
Predictor Contract Contract
(1) (2) (3)
Turnover probability 0.013
(0.137)
Low turnover probability -0.004
(0.004)
Medium turnover probability -0.001
(0.004)
High turnover probability 0.001
(0.005)
Election year 0.001
(0.004)
Mills -0.323** -0.322** -0.324**
(0.009) (0.136) (0.141)
Constant 0.145*** 0.145*** 0.151***
(0.045) (0.044) (0.046)
Firm-executive F.E. Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 74% 72% 74%
N 9,030 9,030 9,030
Turnover probability 0.015
(0.434)
Low turnover probability -0.003
(0.006)
Medium turnover probability 0.004
(0.005)
High turnover probability -0.006
(0.007)
Election year 0.004
(0.005)
Mills 0.027 0.019 0.022
(0.434) (0.435) (0)
Constant 0.009 0.018 0.016
(0.141) (0.139) (0.141)
Firm-executive F.E. Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 6% 4% 6%
N 8,375 8,375 8,375
Panel A: ROA
Panel B: Stock returns
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Table 8 
Heterogeneity 
 
This table presents the results of OLS regressions, reporting coefficients and standard errors underneath. Standard errors are bootstrapped using 1999 replications. The dependent variable is volatility, and each 
column presents the regression results for a subsample indicated in the heading. Asterisks indicate that the estimates are significantly different from zero at the *** 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level. 
Lowest quintile Highest quintile Yes No Lowest quintile Highest quintile Internal CEO External CEO Finance Oil
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Turnover probability -0.6707*** -1.1981*** -0.5404*** -0.8373*** -0.8938*** -0.6232*** -0.6861*** -0.8156*** -0.2284 -0.7030**
(0.236) (0.234) (0.097) (0.126) (0.159) (0.189) (0.119) (0.195) (0.14) (0.275)
t-test of difference -1.59 2.87 3.37 -0.57 
Constant 3.691*** 4.167*** 3.177*** 3.475*** 3.593*** 2.942*** 3.331*** 3.641*** 2.997*** 3.553***
(0.126) (0.133) (0.066) (0.077) (0.1) (0.099) (0.068) (0.127) (0.093) (0.074)
Firm-executive F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 68% 66% 70% 64% 66% 54% 65% 68% 79% 72%
(3) (4) (7) (8) (9) (10) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Low turnover probability 0.0079 -0.0633 -0.036 0.2284*** 0.0303 0.0344 0.0829 0.1448 0.0766 0.1363
(0.114) (0.121) (0.052) (0.079) (0.092) (0.086) (0.051) (0.137) (0.068) (0.199)
t-test of difference -0.43 2.79 0.03 0.42
Medium turnover probability -0.3012*** -0.1901* -0.1504*** -0.0646 -0.1757*** -0.0721 -0.1270*** -0.2473*** -0.1204** -0.2021
(0.092) (0.104) (0.048) (0.054) (0.063) (0.071) (0.043) (0.085) (0.055) (0.158)
t-test of difference 0.80 1.18 1.10 -1.26 
High turnover probability -0.3955*** -0.8442*** -0.4708*** -0.3766*** -0.5371*** -0.4490*** -0.4177*** -0.4240*** -0.0764 -0.3137
(0.126) (0.13) (0.059) (0.068) (0.08) (0.097) (0.061) (0.099) (0.071) (0.197)
t-test of difference -6.84 1.04 0.70 -0.05 
Constant 3.662*** 3.959*** 3.172*** 3.208*** 3.407*** 2.781*** 3.208*** 3.502*** 2.183*** 3.100***
(0.089) (0.095) (0.052) (0.054) (0.064) (0.067) (0.049) (0.084) (0.06) (0.186)
Firm-executive F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 68% 66% 70% 64% 66% 54% 64% 63% 55% 69%
N 2,007 1,969 5,495 5,117 3,974 2,149 6,558 2,278 2,240 368
Panel A: Turnover probability
Chairman-CEO
Panel B: Turnover risk quantiles
IndustryInstitutional ownershipQ Internal CEO
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Table 9 
Identification 
 
 
Panel A presents descriptive statistics of alternative cycle and contract horizon measures. Panel B and D present the results of OLS 
regressions, reporting coefficients and standard errors underneath. The dependent variable is volatility. In Panel D, turnover probability is 
estimated with the length of the previous contract. Panel C presents presents the results of hazard model estimations, reporting hazard ratios 
for CEO turnover and standard errors underneath. Asterisks indicate that the estimates are significantly different from zero at the *** 1% 
level, ** 5% level, * 10% level. 
Length Within-firm
(in years) st.dev.
Cycle length
CAPEX, average 3.89 0.35 0.92
CAPEX, recent 0.98
R&D, average 4.18 0.26 0.97
Historic contract length
Previous contract 2.96 0.23 0.61
Previous 2 contracts 2.97 0.13 0.57
Previous 3 contracts 3.21 0.09 0.35
Industry contract horizon
Average contract length 4.13 0.96 1.25
Average years remaining 0.00
Average new contract length 3.10 0.81 0.60
Directorships 1.07
CAPEX CAPEX R&D All contracts All contracts New contracts
Average Recent Average Length Remaining time
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Turnover risk -1.148*** -1.241*** -1.577* -0.788*** -0.854*** -0.769***
0.276449 0.285643 0.850829 0.0966047 0.0963827 0.10015
Remaining years in cycle 0.054 0.013 0.157 -0.024** -0.063*** 0.006
0.0364423 0.0330613 0.131952 0.0121607 0.0163756 0.0157869
Constant 3.589*** 3.763*** 4.126*** 3.468*** 3.563*** 3.373***
0.20235 0.193298 0.690516 0.0679203 0.06431 0.0703085
Firm-Executive  F.E. Y Y Y Y Y Y
R-squared 66.20% 65.70% 65.50% 65.10% 65.20% 64.70%
N 1,960 1,905 270 10,228 10,206 9,775
Recent Recent 2 Recent 3
(1) (2) (3)
Remaining years (previous contract) 0.9606* 0.9680 0.9738
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Year F.E. Y Y Y
N 2,550 2,584 2,598
CAPEX CAPEX R&D All contracts All contracts New contracts
Average Recent Average Length Remaining time
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Turnover risk (previous contract) -2.473*** -2.579*** -2.963** -1.227*** -1.217*** -1.253***
(0.652) (0.644) (1.223) (0.192) (0.189) (0.194)
Remaining years in cycle 0.02 -0.061 0.143 0.122 0.015 0.099**
(0.103) (0.092) (0.253) (0.083) (0.086) (0.043)
Constant 5.087*** 5.445*** 5.679*** 3.533*** 3.915*** 3.709***
(0.623) (0.602) (0.986) (0.344) (0.243) (0.203)
Firm-Executive  F.E. Y Y Y Y Y Y
R-squared 59.10% 61% 57.90% 66.30% 66.20% 66.50%
N 623 509 73 2,199 2,191 2,140
Panel B: Alternative cycles vs. contract based career risk. Dependent variable = volatility
Difference to actual contract
(in remaining years)
Panel D: Alternative cycles vs. career risk estimated with previous contract. Dependent variable = volatility
Expansion cycles Industry contract horizon
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of alternative cycle and predicted contracts
Panel C: Predicting CEO turnover. Cox hazard models
Expansion cycles Industry contract horizon
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Table 9 
Other firm/executive characteristics 
 
 
 
 
This table present the results of OLS regressions, reporting coefficients and standard errors underneath that are bootstrapped using 1999 
replications. The dependent variable is volatility. Asterisks indicate that the estimates are significantly different from zero at the *** 1% 
level, ** 5% level, * 10% level. 
Compensation Execucomp 
sample
Age Tenure Firm age Firm F.E. CEO F.E.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Turnover probability -0.5905*** -0.6004*** -0.664*** -0.484*** -0.355*** -0.781*** -0.667***
(0.087) (0.105) (0.077) (0.075) (0.079) (0.079) (0.107)
Sensitivity of unvested equity grants 0.0032*
                                   (0.00186)
Sensitivity of vested equity grants -0.0002
                                   (0.00015)
Log total compensation -0.0421
                                   (0.045)
Group 1 (age < 55 / tenure < 3) 0.207** 0.481***
(0.08104) (0.06447)
Group 2 (age 55-60 / tenure 3-5) 0.091 0.317***
(0.07694) (0.06766)
Group 3 (age 60-64 / tenure 6-8) -0.027 0.157**
(0.07662) (0.06326)
Log firm age -0.363***
(0.05333)
Constant 3.2280*** 2.9175*** 2.539** 0.959
(0.35) (0.052) (1.12) (2.295)
Firm-executive F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age group F.E. Yes
Tenure group F.E. Yes
Firm F.E. Yes
Executive F.E. Yes
R-squared 64% 64% 66% 66% 66% 63% 65%
N 4,730 4,730 9,030 9,030 9,030 9,030 4,916
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Table 11 
Robustness 
 
 
This table present the results of OLS regressions, reporting coefficients and standard errors underneath that are bootstrapped using 1999 
replications. The dependent variable is volatility. In column 3, turnover probability is estimated with a sample excluding the first year of 
each CEO. In column 4, low (medium, high) turnover probability denotes the first (eighth and ninths, tenth) decile of turnover risk. 
Asterisks indicate that the estimates are significantly different from zero at the *** 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level. 
 
  
Years to actual 
turnover
Last two years No first year Deciles
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Turnover probability -0.967***
(0.099)
Actual time to turnover 0.077***
(0.01)
Last two years before turnover -0.338***
(0.05)
Low turnover probability -0.090*
(0.052)
Medium turnover probability -0.387***
(0.031)
High turnover probability -0.557***
(0.049)
Constant 2.871*** 3.145*** 2.539** 1.017***
(0.047) (0.033) (1.12) (0.292)
Firm-executive F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 66% 64% 63% 65%
N 7,153 11,990 9,284 10,366
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APPENDIX 
 
A.1. At-will exceptions 
 
This table presents the at-will exceptions by state.  
Code State Public policy Implied contract
Good faith and 
fair dealing
AL Alabama 0 1 1
AK Alaska 1 1 1
AZ Arizona 1 1 1
AR Arkansas 1 1 0
CA California 1 1 1
CO Colorado 1 1 0
CT Connecticut 1 1 0
DC District of Columbia 1 1 0
DE Delaware 1 0 1
FL Florida 0 0 0
GA Georgia 0 0 0
HI Hawaii 1 1 0
ID Idaho 1 1 1
IL Illinois 1 1 0
IN Indiana 1 0 0
IA Iowa 1 1 0
KS Kansas 1 1 0
KY Kentucky 0 1 0
LA Louisiana 0 0 0
ME Maine 0 1 0
MD Maryland 1 1 0
MA Massachusetts 1 0 1
MI Michigan 1 1 0
MN Minnesota 1 1 0
MS Mississippi 1 1 0
MO Missouri 1 0 0
MT Montana 1 0 1
NE Nebraska 0 1 0
NV Nevada 1 1 1
NH New Hampshire 1 1 0
NJ New Jersey 1 1 0
NM New Mexico 1 1 0
NY New York 0 1 0
NC North Carolina 1 0 0
ND North Dakota 1 1 0
OH Ohio 1 1 0
OK Oklahoma 1 1 0
OR Oregon 1 1 0
PA Pennsylvania 1 0 0
RI Rhode Island 0 0 0
SC South Carolina 1 1 0
SD South Dakota 1 1 0
TN Tennessee 1 1 0
TX Texas 0 0 0
UT Utah 1 1 1
VT Vermont 1 1 0
VA Virginia 1 0 0
WA Washington 1 1 0
WV West Virginia 1 1 0
WI Wisconsin 1 1 0
WY Wyoming 1 1 1
At-will exceptions
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A.2. Variable definitions 
 
 
 
Age Executive’s age in years
AIMR Industry adjusted AIMR scores (see Brown and Hillegeist, 2007)
Analyst forecast STD Standard deviation of analyst forecasts of that year's EPS
Annual stock returns Fiscal year total stock returns
Anti-takeover State with “business combination laws” according to Bertrand and Mullainathan (1999)
Assets Book assets (in $ millions)
Beta Coefficient on the market excess returns in a regression in which the dependent variable is the daily stock return, run for each firm-year
Book-to-market (B/M)
Ratio of the book value of assets to the market value of assets: the market value is calculated as 
the sum of the book value of assets and the market value of common stock less the book value 
of common stock, cash, and deferred taxes. Market values are measured at the end of the fiscal 
year.
CAPEX/assets Capital expenditures divided by lagged assets
Cash flow Earnings before extraordinary items plus depreciation, divided by lagged assets
Chairman and CEO 1 if the CEO also holds the Chairman position of the Board
Contract length Expiration year minus start year of the contract
Dividend 1 if the fim pays dividends that year
Election year 1 if the contract is due to expire in the following year
Exception rule 1 if the contract is governed by the law of a state with a good faith & fair dealing at-will 
Finance industry 1 if the firm operates in the Banking or Insurance industry
Garmaise Index of Garmaise (2006)
Governance index The index developed by Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003)
Idiosyncratic risk Standard deviation of residuals in a regression in which the dependent variable is the daily stock 
return, run for each firm-year
Incentive to total compensation Value of bonus, stock, and option grants to total CEO pay
Industry homogeneity
Median (across all firms of one of the 49 Fama-French industries) of the percentage variation in 
monthly stock returns that is explained by an equally weighted industry index; market-adjusted 
returns are annual stock returns adjusted by the value-weighted CRSP index.
Industry sales volatility 49 Fama-French industry average of variance in sales over the past seven years
Industry survival rate Industry rate of year-to-year survival within the COMPUSTAT database
Institutional ownership Percentage of shares owned by institutional owners that file form 13f
Leverage Net debt divided by total assets
Low analyst forecast error 1 if analyst forecast STD is below median
Market-to-book Reciprocal of book-to-market
Number of SEOs Number of equity issuances announced by the firm in the given year
Percent CEO ownership Percentage of shares owned by the CEO
Percent insiders on board Percentage of insiders among board members
Percent unexercisable Value of unexercisable options divided by the value of unexercised options
R&D/assets Research and development expenditures divided by lagged assets
Remaining years Expiration year minus current year
Renewal Indicator variable for CEOs who were in office at the time of the contract start
Restatement 1 if the firm files an earnings restatement in that year
Return on assets (ROA) Earnings before interest and taxes divided by assets
Sensitivity of vested equity grants Stock price sensitivity of vested equity grants calculated using the method of Core and Guay (2002)
Sensitivity of unvested equity grants Stock price sensitivity of unvested equity grants calculated using the method of Core and Guay (2002)
Stock return Annual stock returns
Salary CEO’s base salary in thousands of US$, adjusted to 2000 $
Tenure Number of years the CEO has been in office
Tenure performance The stock return measured over the preceding 5 years, or since the start of the CEO's tenure, 
whichever is shorter, scaled by its standard deviation
Total compensation CEO’s total annual compensation (TDC1) in thousands of US$, adjusted to 2000 $
Turnover 1 if the executive leaves the CEO position
Volatility Standard deviation of daily stock returns
